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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a framework for privacy-preserving outsourced functional computation across large-scale multiple
encrypted domains, which we refer to as POFD. With POFD, a user can obtain the output of a function computed over encrypted data
from multiple domains while protecting the privacy of the function itself, its input and its output. Specifically, we introduce two notions of
POFD, the basic POFD and its enhanced version, in order to tradeoff the levels of privacy protection and performance. We present
three protocols, named Multi-domain Secure Multiplication protocol (MSM), Secure Exponent Calculation protocol with private Base
(SECB), and Secure Exponent Calculation protocol (SEC), as the core sub-protocols for POFD to securely compute the outsourced
function. Detailed security analysis shows that the proposed POFD achieves the goal of calculating a user-defined function across
different encrypted domains without privacy leakage to unauthorized parties. Our performance evaluations using simulations
demonstrate the utility and the efficiency of POFD.
Index Terms—Privacy-preserving, function privacy, homomorphic encryption, outsourced computation, large-scale, multiple encrypted
domains
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing, which provides data storage andcomputation resources dynamically for individuals
and organizations, gains momentum in many areas such as
Internet of Things (IoT) [1], e-commerce [2], and scientific
research [3], [4]. Cloud computing has drawn much atten-
tion from governments to industries and academics. For
example, the U.S federal government has been shifting its
data storage to cloud-based services in order to reduce the
total investment by the federal government in information
technology [5], [6]. Amazon operates an Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) to provide a resizable computing capacity for
users [7]. Some research labs [8], [9] have been set up to
focus on cloud computing research.
Data stored in the cloud are maintained by many service
providers and clients frequently use multiple sources of
information in their decision making process. For example,
let us consider a stock brokerage firmwhich selects preferred
stocks or bonds based on a proprietary prediction function
with numerous dimensional input values. The time consum-
ing computation of the prediction function could be out-
sourced to a computation service provider in the cloud,
which gathers data from multiple stock markets as inputs,
evaluates the function, and returns the results to the firm.
Based on the results of the computation, the firm provides
appropriate recommendations of financial securities to its
clients. Although functional computation across different
domains can bring tremendous benefits to users, its wide-
spread adoption in the cloud hinges on understanding and
managing its flexibility, information security and privacy
challenges. In the brokerage firm example, as the prediction
function and its output contain highly sensitive information,
without privacy protection, the firmwould be very reluctant
to outsource its functional computation to the computation
service provider. Furthermore, market data from different
sources contain valuable and sensitive information, and out-
source such data directly to the cloud without adequate pro-
tection will definitely damage data providers’ interests. In
short, both the firm’s interest and the data providers’ inter-
ests must be protected in the cloud.
In this paper, to address the above-mentioned privacy
issues in outsourced functional computation, we propose a
framework for Privacy-preserving Outsourced Functional
computation framework across large-scale multiple enc-
rypted Domains (POFD), which allows a user to obtain the
output of an outsourced functional computed over enc-
rypted data across multiple domains while protecting the
privacy of the function itself, its input and its output. Specif-
ically, major contributions of the paper are fourfold.
 Firstly, we propose the generic POFD framework
which allows secure computation of a user defined
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polynomial function over multiple encrypted
domains. With POFD, the outsourced polynomial
function and the final output will not be leaked to
other parties while different data from different
domains will also be protected. Moreover, two dif-
ferent versions of POFD, called basic POFD and
enhanced POFD, are introduced in order to balance
security and performance.
 Secondly, to construct the basic POFD, we present a
multi-domain secure multiplication (MSM) protocol
which allows a cloud server to do multiplication
over two encrypted data from two different
encrypted domains, and construct a protocol called a
Secure Exponent Calculation protocol with private
Base (SECB) which allows a cloud server to do expo-
nential computation with public power and
encrypted base in a privacy-preserving way.
 Thirdly, in order to construct the enhanced POFD, a
sub-protocol named Secure Exponent Calculation pro-
tocol (SEC) is introduced to securely compute expo-
nential computation over two encrypted data from
different domains. The enhanced POFDpermits a user
to retrieve results computed over different encrypted
domains while without leaking any information on
the outsourced function to the cloud platform.
 Fourthly, to validate the efficiency of the proposed
POFD, we design and implement a POFD simulator in
Java. Extensive simulation results show that POFD is
efficient in both computation and communication.
Application. The POFD framework in the present paper
focuses on protecting privacy of outsourced polynomial
functions. Polynomial functions [10] are considered as one
of the most important kernel in Support Vector Machines
(SVMs), which find numerous applications, such as predic-
tion of foreign currency exchange rates [11], prediction of
bankruptcy [12], and protein subcellular localization [13].
Protecting polynomial function is the key to protect polyno-
mial kernel SVM. The protected model can be used for pri-
vacy-preserving classification and prediction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we describe some preliminaries which serve as
the basis of our proposed protocols. In Section 3, we formal-
ize the POFD system model, state its privacy requirements
and identify our design goal. Then, we present two different
versions of POFD in Section 4, followed by security analysis
in Section 5 and performance evaluation in Section 6,
respectively. In Section 7, we discuss some related works.
Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARY
In this section, we outline the Paillier cryptosystem and a
Secure Multiplication (SM) protocol, which will serve as the
basis of the proposed POFD. Before that, we list the main
notations used in the paper in Table 1.
2.1 Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier cryptosystem is an additive homomorphic and
probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme whose security
is based on the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assump-
tion [14]. Suppose Epkðm1Þ and Epkðm2Þ are two ciphertexts
under the same public key pk, the Paillier cryptosystem has
the following properties:
1) Additive homomorphism: given two ciphertexts Epkðm1Þ
and Epkðm2Þ, it hasDskðEpkðm1Þ  Epkðm2ÞÞ ¼ m1 þm2.
2) Scalar-multiplicative homomorphism: given a constant c
and Epkðm1Þ, it hasDskðEpkðm1ÞcÞ ¼ c m1.
3) Self-blinding: given a ciphertext Epkðm1Þ, it can be re-
randomized into a new ciphertext E0pkðm1Þ such that Dsk
ðE0pkðm1ÞÞ ¼ DskðEpkðm1ÞÞ ¼ m1.
2.2 Secure Multiplication (SM) Protocol
Let Alice and Bob be two parties in the Secure Multiplica-
tion (SM) protocol described in [15]. Let pk and sk be Alice’s
public and private key pair under the Paillier cryptosystem.
Given encrypted data EpkðxÞ and EpkðyÞ under the same pk,
the goal of the SM protocol is to allow Bob to obtain
Epkðx  yÞ while without leaking x and y to both Alice and
Bob. The steps of the SM protocol are shown as follows:
Step 1: Bob selects two random numbers rx; ry 2 ZN , cal-
culates x0 ¼ EpkðxÞ  EpkðrxÞ and y0 ¼ EpkðyÞ  EpkðryÞ, sends
x0 and y0 to Alice.
Step 2: Alice decrypts x0 and y0 by using the secret key sk,
and multiplies them as h ¼ Dskðx0Þ Dskðy0Þ. Then Alice
encrypts h by using pk to obtain h0 ¼ EpkðhÞ, and sends h0 to
Bob. It can be easily verified that h ¼ ðxþ rxÞðyþ ryÞmodN .
Step 3: Once h0 is received, Bob first computes s1 ¼ Epk
ðxÞNry , s2 ¼ EpkðyÞNrx and s3 ¼ Epkðrx  ryÞN1. Then, Bob
calculates the following formula to gain the encrypted x  y:
h0  s1  s2  s3 ¼ Epkðh ry  x rx  y rx  ryÞ ¼ Epkðx  yÞ:
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOAL
In this section, we formalize the system model, identify pri-
vacy requirements, and describe our design goals.
3.1 System Model
Our system consists of five types of generic entities: Trusted
Authority (TA), Request Users (RUs), Cloud Platform (CP),
Computation Service Providers (CSPs), and Data Providers
(DPs)—see Fig. 1.
3.1.1 TA
TA is assumed to be trusted by all the other entities in the
system to distribute and manage all the private keys
involved in the system.
TABLE 1
Definitions and Notations in POFD
Symbol Definition
pkj Public key in the jth domain
skj Weak private key in the jth domain
SK Strong private key
SKðiÞ Partial strong private key
EpkðÞ Encryption function of cryptosystem
DSKðÞ Decryption function with private key SK
Dþ
SKðiÞ ðÞ partial decryption with partial strong private key (PSDec)
DðÞ Decryption with partially decrypted ciphertext (DDec)
jxj Bit length of x
a  b Multiplication of a and b over a cyclic group
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3.1.2 RUs
The goal of a RU is to get computation results across multi-
ple encrypted domains according to a function he defines.
The RU sends a query to CP, specifying the function in a pri-
vacy-preserving manner.
3.1.3 CP
A CP contains unlimited data storage space which stores
and manages all the data outsourced from DP. Also, the
CP stores all the intermediate and final results in
encrypted form. Furthermore, the CP has some computa-
tion abilities to perform certain calculations over
encrypted data.
3.1.4 CSPs
A CSP provides online computation service to RUs, e.g., a
CSP can process encrypted data, such as multiplication over
the encrypted data. Also, CSPs are able to partially
decrypted ciphertexts which are sent from CP, perform cer-
tain calculations over the partially decrypted data, and then
re-encrypt the result with the RU’s public key. We assume
that our system requires a CSPs (a  2).
3.1.5 DP
Data are generated by DPs, encrypted using their own pub-
lic keys, and then outsourced to CP for storage. Note that
the number of DP can be far more than the number of online
CSPs (g  a).
Consider a data space D defined by a set of g dimen-
sions fx1; . . . ; xgg and a dataset S on D with cardinality
g. Each DP generates and is in charge of one or multiple
dimensions of the dataset. For simplicity, we assume
each DP is only in charge of one dimension in POFD
system, i.e., DP k only manages dimension k of the data-
set (see Fig. 2). A transaction ~ai 2 S can be represented
as ~ai ¼ ðai;1; . . . ; ai;gÞ, where ai;k is a value on dimension
dk ði ¼ 1; . . . ; t; k ¼ 1; . . . ; gÞ. The DP z wants to do some
calculations over the encrypted dataset stored in CP.
According to polynomial function F , the RU z wants to
calculate
F : o ¼
Xk
j¼1
Cjx
tj;1
1   x
tj;g
g ;
across different domains (as xk is provided by DP k). This
kind of functions can be used for statistical analysis. For
example, the RU can calculate the arithmetic mean
x ¼ ðPgk¼1 xkÞ=g across different dimensions. The standard
deviation s ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
g
Pg
k¼1ðxk  xÞ2
q
can also be calculated
(notice that X ¼ 1
g
Pg
k¼1ðxk  xÞ2, a special case of F , can be
computed on server side, the RU can calculate
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X
p
by him-
self to get the standard deviation). Moreover, for polyno-
mial kernel SVM classification, the classifier is to map the
data from the input space X to a feature space F . In the
space F , the discriminant function is fðxÞ ¼Pgk¼1 &ðx;
xkÞ þ b, where &ðx; x0Þ ¼ ðxTx0 þ 1Þd is a degree-d polynomial
kernel.
All the functions used in POFD are defined over ring of
integers Z, thus the function must satisfy the following
restriction: 1) the size of output of the function must less
than N , i.e., joj < N . 2) the size of every monomials must
be less than N , i.e., jCjxtj;11   x
tj;g
g j < N for every j. If the
function is defined over ZN , the function used in POFD has
no such restriction, i.e., the function is formalized as
F : o ¼
Xk
j¼1
Cjx
tj;1
1   x
tj;g
g modN:
3.2 Security and Privacy Requirements
In our security and privacy model, the internal parties CP,
CSPs, DPs and RUs are assumed to be curious-but-honest in
the sense that they strictly follow the proposed protocol, but
are interested in other parties’ data, e.g., both CP and CSPs
are curious about RU’s private query. In POFD, we assume
that a RU has limited computation and communication
resources. To provide a flexible tradeoff between security
and performance, we define two concrete privacy levels to
against active adversary A as follows.
Definition 1. (Level-I Privacy): Upon completion of the POFD
computation, A cannot learn the coefficients Cjðj ¼ 1; . . . ; kÞ
of the outsourced function F and the final output.
Definition 2. (Level-II Privacy): Upon completion of the POFD
computation, A cannot learn the coefficients Cjðj ¼ 1; . . . ; kÞ,
degrees tj;1 . . . ; tj;g , the size k, the format of the outsourced
function F and the final output.
Fig. 2. Encrypted dataset stored in CP.
Fig. 1. System model under consideration.
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To satisfy these privacy requirements, the active adver-
sary A in our model has the following attacking abilities: A
may eavesdrop on all the communication links to get the
encrypted data, e.g., the encrypted coefficients Cjðj ¼ 1; . . . ;
kÞ of the outsourced function F . Also, A may compromise
CP, and some CSPs, DPs and some RUs simultaneously, but
subject to the following restrictions: 1) A cannot compro-
mise a CSPs at the same time, even A can get compromised
CSPs’ partially decryption keys and decryption services.
2) A cannot compromise the RU who provides the out-
sourced function.
3.3 Design Goal
In order to achieve the outsourced functional calculation
over large-scale multiple encrypted domains in the afore-
mentioned model, our POFD will fulfill privacy and perfor-
mance guarantees as follows:
 Minimizing communication cost: for a resource limited
RU, one round communication between the RU and
the server is optimal.
 Reducing key management cost: a large number of par-
ties are involved in the system, so efficient key man-
agement is necessary.
 Privacy-preserving computation over multi-encrypted
domains: as data belonging to different encrypted
domains, our POFD should be designed for comput-
ing across multiple encrypted domains and satisfy-
ing the privacy requirements.
4 PROPOSED POFD FRAMEWORK
In this section, we will introduce two versions of POFD,
called basic privacy-preserving outsourced function compu-
tation framework across large-scale multiple encrypted
domains (basic POFD) and its enhanced version (enhanced
POFD), respectively, to achieve different privacy levels
defined in Section 3.2.
4.1 Public-Key Cryptosystem with Distributed
Decryption (PCDD)
In order to realize POFD, Paillier-based cryptosystem with
two trapdoors proposed by Bresson et al. [16] is a suitable
solution for key management with the large-scale encrypted
domains at first glance. However, leakage of the strong trap-
door/key will bring huge threat to the system (all the
encrypted data in Bresson’s cryptosystem can be decrypted
by the strong trapdoor). In order to solve the problem, we
design a new cryptosystem called Public-Key Cryptosystem
with Distributed Decryption (PCDD) to separate the strong
key into different shares in order to reduce the risk. PCDD
is based on Bresson et al. [16]’s cryptosystem and works as
follows:
KeyGen: Given a security parameter k and two large
prime numbers p; q, where jpj ¼ jqj ¼ k. Due to the property
of the strong primes, we have two strong primes p0; q0, s.t.,
p0 ¼ p12 and q0 ¼ q12 . Then, compute N ¼ pq and  ¼ lcm
ðp 1; q  1Þ=2. Define a function LðxÞ ¼ x1N , then choose a
generator g of order ðp 1Þðq  1Þ=2 (It can be achieved by
selecting a random number a 2 Z
N2
and computing g as
g ¼ a2N [17]). Randomly select u 2 ½1; N=4 and compute
h ¼ gu modN2. The public key is pk ¼ ðN; g; hÞ, the weak pri-
vate key is sk ¼ u, and the strong private key is SK ¼ .
Encryption (Enc): Given a message m 2 ZN , choose a ran-
dom number r 2 ½1; N=4. The ciphertext can be generated
as EpkðmÞ ¼ fT1; T2g, where T1 ¼ hrð1þmNÞmodN2; T2 ¼
grmodN2.
Decryption with weak private key (WDec): EpkðxÞ can be
decrypted by using decryption algorithm DskðÞ with weak
private key sk ¼ u by calculating,
m ¼ L T1
T u2
modN2
 
:
Decryption with strong private key (SDec): EpkðmÞ can be
decrypted using decryption algorithm DSKðÞ with strong
private key SK ¼  by first calculating,
T1 modN
2 ¼ gurð1þmNÞmodN2 ¼ ð1þmNÞ:
Then, due to gcdð;NÞ ¼ 1,m can be recovered as:
m ¼ LðT1 modN2Þ1 modN:
Strong private key splitting (SkeyS): The strong private key
SK ¼  can be randomly separated into a parts and denote
the partial strong private keys as SKðiÞ ¼ i ði ¼ 1; . . . ;aÞ, s.
t.,
Pa
i¼1 i 	 0mod and
Pa
i¼1 i 	 1modN2 hold at the
same time (the existence of the strong private key splitting
can be found in Section 5.1.1).
Partial decryption with partial strong private key (PSDec):
Once EpkðmÞ ¼ fT1; T2g is received, the PSDec algorithm
Dþ
SKðiÞ ðÞ can be run as follows:
Using partial strong private key SKðiÞ ¼ i, the partially
decrypted ciphertext CT ðiÞ can be calculated as:
CT ðiÞ ¼ ðT1Þi ¼ gruið1þmNiÞmodN2:
Decryption with partially decrypted ciphertext (DDec): Once
CT ð1Þ; . . . ; CT ðaÞ are received, the DDec algorithm DðÞ can
be run to get the original messagem.
The algorithm firstly computes T 00 ¼Qai¼1 CT ðiÞ, and then
calculates
m ¼ LðT 00Þ:
Notice that, for givenm 2 ZN ,
EpkðmÞN1 ¼ fð1þ ðN  1Þm NÞ  hðN1Þr1 modN2;
gðN1Þr1 modN2g ¼ EpkðmÞ:
4.2 Key Distribution of POFD
Before executing POFD, TA should generate all the private
keys and distribute them to the corresponding parties. Sup-
pose there are a CSPs, g DPs, b RUs and one CP involved in
the POFD.
TA firstly runs KeyGen algorithm to generate a strong pri-
vate key SK and g þ b weak private keys skd ¼ ud
(d ¼ 1; . . . ; g þ b) under the same ðN; gÞ. TA uses ud to gener-
ate hd ¼ gud , and denotes the public key as pkd ¼ ðN; g; hdÞ.
The public-private key pair ðskk; pkkÞk¼1;...;g are sent to the
corresponding DPk, and ðskz; pkzÞz¼gþ1;...;b are sent to the
corresponding RU z. Moreover, extra public-private key
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pairs ðskSz ; pkSzÞ1 and generated, while no party directly
holds skSz in the system. Next, TA uses the strong private
key SK to generate a partial strong private keys SKðiÞði ¼ 1;
. . . ;aÞ by running SkeyS algorithm, sends SKðiÞ to CSPi for
storage respectively. Furthermore, pkS are sent to CSPs1
and CSPs2 for storage,
2 while pkS, pkk and pkz ðk ¼ 1; . . . ;
g; z ¼ g þ 1; . . . ;bÞ are send to CP.
The goal of using the partial strong private keys is to pro-
hibit some curious CSPs from decrypting the ciphertext
directly which could be intercepted from the public trans-
mission link. After distributing all these keys, POFD will be
executed. Note that the POFD considered below are associ-
ated with a specific RU, say z, we will simply use ðskS; pkSÞ
instead of ðskSz ; pkSzÞ. Next, we give the detailed construc-
tion of POFD in different privacy levels.
4.3 Basic POFD for Achieving Level-I Privacy
Before constructing basic POFD, two protocols called Multi-
domains Secure Multiplication protocol (MSM) and Secure
Exponent Calculation protocol with private Base (SECB),
are needed below.
4.3.1 Multi-Domain Secure Multiplication Protocol
(MSM)
The MSM protocol involves aþ 1 parties, the CP and CSPi
ði ¼ 1; . . . ;aÞ. Support that CP has two encrypted data
EpkiðxÞ and EpkjðyÞ under different encrypted domains
(domain i and j). The goal of MSM protocol is to calculate
EpkSðx  yÞ in jointly encrypted domain S without leaking x
and y to CP and all CSPs. The steps of MSM protocol are
shown as follows:
Step-1(@CP): CP selects four random numbers r1; r2; R1;
R2 2 ZN , calculates
X ¼ EpkiðxÞ  Epkiðr1Þ; Y ¼ EpkjðyÞ  Epkjðr2Þ;
S1 ¼ EpkiðxÞNr2  EpkiðR1Þ ¼ EpkiðR1  r2xÞ;
S2 ¼ EpkjðyÞNr1  EpkjðR2Þ ¼ EpkjðR2  r1yÞ;
and sendsX, Y , S1 and S2 to all the online CSPs.
Step-2(@CSPi)
3: CSPi uses SK
ðiÞ to compute the partially
decrypted ciphertexts XðiÞ ¼ PSDecðXÞ, Y ðiÞ ¼ PSDecðY Þ,
S
ðiÞ
1 ¼ PSDecðS1Þ, SðiÞ2 ¼ PSDecðS2Þ, and sends XðiÞ, Y ðiÞ, SðiÞ1
and S
ðiÞ
2 to CSPs1.
Step-3(@CSPs1): CSPs1 calculates
P1 ¼ DDecðSð1Þ1 ; . . . ; SðaÞ1 Þ; P2 ¼ DDecðSð1Þ2 ; . . . ; SðaÞ2 Þ;
H ¼ DDecðXð1Þ; . . . ; XðaÞÞ; P ¼ DDecðY ð1Þ; . . . ; Y ðaÞÞ;
and multiplies H and P as h ¼ H  P . Then CSPs1 encrypts
P1, P2, and h by using pkS, denotes them as T
0
1 ¼ EpkSðP1Þ
and T 02 ¼ EpkSðP2Þ and h0 ¼ EpkSðhÞ respectively, and sends
T 01; T
0
2 and h
0 to CP. It can be easily verified that H ¼ xþ r1;
P ¼ yþ r2, and h ¼ ðxþ r1Þðyþ r2Þ.
Step-4(@CP): Once T 01, T
0
2 and h
0 are received, CP first
computes S3 ¼ EpkSðr1  r2ÞN1, S4 ¼ EpkSðR1ÞN1, S5 ¼
EpkSðR2ÞN1, then calculates the following formula to gain
the encrypted x  y:
h0  T 01  T 02  S3  S4  S5
¼ EpkSðhþ ðR1  r2  xÞ þ ðR2  r1  yÞ  r1  r2 R1 R2Þ
¼ EpkSðx  yÞ:
In order to illustrate MSM clearly, we draw a flowchart of
MSM in Fig. 3.
4.3.2 Secure Exponent Calculation Protocol with
Private Base
The SECB protocol involves aþ 1 parties (CP,
CSP1; . . . ;CSPa). Suppose that CP has an encrypted data
EpkiðxÞ and an integer d. The goal of SECB protocol is to calcu-
late EpkSðxdÞ. Note that calculating EpkSðxdÞ can be achieved
by MSM protocol (by running MSMðEpkiðxÞ; EpkiðxÞÞ for d 1
times), but it involves d 1 rounds communication overhead.
The SECB protocol is designed to computeEpkSðxdÞ efficiently
in one round.4 The steps ofSECB are shown as follows:
Step-1(@CP): CP selects a random number h 2 Z2p0q0 , cal-
culates X ¼ EpkiðxÞh and s ¼ ðhdÞ1 modN , sends X to CSPi
ði ¼ 1; . . . ;aÞ and sends d to CSPs1. Notice that s is kept
secret by CP.
Step-2(@CSP i): CSPi computes the partially decrypted
ciphertextXðiÞ ¼ PSDecðXÞ and sendsXðiÞ to CSPs1.
Step-3(@CSP s1): CSPs1 calculates
T1 ¼ DDecðXð1Þ; . . . ; XðaÞÞ
and denotes h as h ¼ ðT1Þd modN . Then CSP encrypts h by
using pkS and denotes it as H ¼ EpkSðhÞ, and sends H to
CP. It can be easily verified that h ¼ ðxhÞdmodN .
Fig. 3. Multi-domain Secure Multiplication (MSM) protocol.
1. The ðskSz ; pkSz Þ are associated with a specific RU z and all g DPs,
i.e., skSz ¼ uz þ
Pg
k¼1 uk and pkSz is corresponding public key.
2. The CSPs1 and CSPs2 are chosen from a CSPs in order to handle
extra calculations.
3. Note i ¼ 1; . . . ;a, include s1, i.e., for all online CSPs. It is same for
the following protocols unless otherwise specified.
4. To avoid CSPs1 to arbitrary change encrypted domain, the CSPs1
only holds pkS, i.e., The execution of SECB protocol will change the
encrypted domain from i to S.
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Step-4(@CP): Once H is received, CP calculates the fol-
lowing formula to gain the encrypted xd:
Hs ¼ EpkSððxhÞd  ðhdÞ1Þ ¼ EpkSðxdÞ:
4.3.3 Construction of Basic POFD
The function information of a RU z should send to CP for
data calculation once the RU launches a request. Due to the
privacy concern, the RU only wants to keep the privacy of
the function’s coefficients, i.e., only the function’s coeffi-
cients are stored in encrypted form, e.g., for the function
F : y ¼ C2x2 þ C1x1 þ C0, the coefficients C2; C1; C0 are
encrypted using PCDD. Both the encrypted coefficients
EpkzðCiÞði ¼ 1; . . . ; tÞ and function’s patten x
tj;1
1   x
tj;g
g ðj ¼
1; . . . ; kÞ are sent to CP. The CP needs to use all these queries
in conjunction with the encrypted dataset Epkkðai;kÞ
ðk ¼ 1; . . . ; gÞ to compute the results privately according to
the RU’s function F . The calculation can be described as
follows:
1. Secure monomials calculation stage (Stage One). In stage
one, CP needs to calculate the monomials over the
encrypted dataset which is formalized as Cjx
tj;1
1   x
tj;g
g . As
all the tj;1; . . . ; tj;g are stored in plaintext form, SECB should
be used to compute EpkSða
tj;1
i;1 Þ; . . . ; EpkSða
tj;g
i;g Þ. For every
i; j; k ði ¼ 1; . . . ; t; j ¼ 1; . . . ; k; k ¼ 1; . . . ; gÞ, CP computes
EpkSða
tj;k
i;k Þ ¼ SECBðEpkkðai;kÞ; tj;kÞ:
Then, CP uses Epkz ðCjÞ and EpkSða
tj;k
i;k Þðk ¼ 1; . . . ; gÞ to cal-
culate EpkSðCja
tj;1
i;1    a
tj;g
i;g Þ by calling MSM protocol for
g-times.5
2. Secure outsourced function calculation stage (Stage Two).
Once the stage one phase is finished, CP needs to use
EpkSðCja
tj;1
i;1    a
tj;g
i;g Þ to compute the final encrypted results
EpkSðoiÞ for every iði ¼ 1; . . . ; tÞ according to the function F
as follows. Firstly, the additive operation over the plaintexts
can be easily achieved by multiplication of the ciphertexts
as follows:
EpkSðoiÞ ¼ EpkS
Xk
j¼1
Cja
tj;1
i;1    a
tj;g
i;g
 !
¼
Yk
j¼1
EpkSðCja
tj;1
i;1    a
tj;g
i;g Þ:
After that, all the encrypted results are sent back to the
RU and can be decrypted only with the DP’s authorization
(see Section 4.5).
4.4 Enhanced POFD for Achieving Level-II Privacy
In enhanced version, the RU encrypts both the coefficient Cj
and the degree tj;k of monomials, and then sends them to
CP. To securely compute the function, the RU must com-
pute the monomials formalized as Cjx
tj;1
1    x
tj;g
g . As xk and
tj;k are stored in encrypted form, it is impossible for CP to
directly compute EpkSðx
tj;k
k Þ. In order to solve the problem,
we first design a protocol called Secure Exponent Calcula-
tion Protocol (SEC) to solve the secure exponential calcula-
tion problem, then use the SEC to construct the enhanced
POFD for achieving level-II privacy.
4.4.1 Secure Exponent Calculation Protocol (SEC)
The SEC involves aþ 1 parties, CP, CSP1; . . . ; and CSPa.
Consider CP has two encrypted data EpkiðxÞ and EpkjðyÞ in
different domains. The goal of SEC protocol is to calculate
EpkSðxyÞ in jointly encrypted domain S without leaking
both x and y to CSP. The steps of SEC protocol are shown as
follows:
Step-1(@CP): CP selects four random numbers R; r;
t1; t2 2 Z2p0q0 , calculates X1 ¼ EpkiðxÞR, X2 ¼ EpkjðyÞ EpkjðrÞ,
Y1 ¼ EpkjðyÞ  Epkjðt1Þ, s1 ¼ Rt1 modN , Y2 ¼ Epki ðxÞt2 , s2 ¼
ðt2ÞrmodN , s3 ¼ ðRrÞ1 modN , and sends X1, X2, Y1 and Y2
to all the CSPs, sends R, r to CSPs2, and keeps s1, s2, s3 pri-
vately by CP.
Step-2(@CSPi): by executing PSDec, CSPi computes the
partially decrypted ciphertext X
ðiÞ
1 ¼ PSDecðX1Þ, XðiÞ2 ¼
PSDecðX2Þ, Y ðiÞ1 ¼ PSDecðY1Þ, Y ðiÞ2 ¼ PSDecðY2Þ, respec-
tively. All the CSPi send X
ðiÞ
1 and X
ðiÞ
2 to CSPs1, and send
Y
ðiÞ
1 and Y
ðiÞ
2 to CSPs2.
Step 3-A(@CSPs1): CSPs1 computes
h ¼ DDecðXð1Þ1 ; . . . ; XðaÞ1 Þ; K0 ¼ DDecðXð1Þ2 ; . . . ; XðaÞ2 Þ;
and calculates f ¼ hK0 modN . Then, CSPs1 encrypts f by
using pkS and denotes it as H ¼ EpkSðfÞ, and sends H to
CP. It can be easily verified that f ¼ ðRxÞyþrmodN .
Step 3-B(@CSPs2): CSPs2 computes
C1 ¼ DDecðY ð1Þ1 ; . . . ; Y ðaÞ1 Þ; C2 ¼ DDecðY ð1Þ2 ; . . . ; Y ðaÞ2 Þ;
and calculates H1 ¼ RC1 modN and H2 ¼ ðC2ÞrmodN .
Moreover, CSPs2 calculates K1 ¼ ðH1Þ1 modN and
K2 ¼ ðH2Þ1 modN , encrypts K1; K2 as K3 ¼ EpkSðK1Þ,
K4 ¼ EpkSðK2Þ respectively, and sends K3 and K4 to CP. It
can be easily verified that K1 ¼ ðRyþt1Þ1 modN and
K2 ¼ ððt2xÞrÞ1 modN .
Step-4(@CP): Once H, K3, K4 are received, CP can calcu-
late the following formula to gain the encrypted xy:
P1 ¼ MSMðH;K3Þ;
P2 ¼ MSMðP1; K4Þ; P3 ¼ ðP2Þs1s2s3 :
It can be easily verified that
ðP2Þs1s2s3 ¼ EpkSðH K1 K2  s1  s2  s3Þ;
¼ EpkSððRxÞyþrðRyþt1Þ1ððt2xÞrÞ1Rt1tr2ðRrÞ1Þ;
¼ EpkSðxyÞ:5. The goal of using pkS is to transfer all the intermediate encrypted
results into jointly encrypted domain. The final result can be decrypted
only with authorization.
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4.4.2 Construction of Enhanced POFD
Before executing the enhanced POFD, the function F used in
basic POFD should be transformed into the new functionF06:
F0 : o ¼
XK
j¼0
Cjx
tj;1
1   x
tj;g
g :
Some redundancy monomials should be added to the origi-
nal function F , and the coefficient of these redundancy
monomials should be 0. The goal of the function transforma-
tion is to avoid adversary guessing how many monomials
contained in F . It is worth noting that the final results calcu-
lated byF andF0 are the same.Moreover, all the dimensions
should be involved in the function. If the RU does not need
the dimension k inmonomial j, simply denote tj;k ¼ 0.
Once the encrypted RU z’s queries EpkzðCjÞ and Epkzðtj;kÞ
are received, CP needs to use all these queries in conjunc-
tion with the encrypted dataset Epkkðai;kÞði ¼ 1; . . . ; t; k ¼
1; . . . ; gÞ to compute the results privately according to the
RU’s function F0. The calculation can be described as the
following stages:
1. Secure monomials calculation stage (Stage One). In stage
one, CP needs to calculate the monomials over the encrypted
data from different domains formalized as Cjx
tj;1
1   x
tj;g
g .
As all the tj;1; . . . ; tj;g are stored in encrypted form,
SEC should be used to compute EpkSða
tj;1
i;1 Þ; . . . ; EpkSða
tj;g
i;g Þ,
respectively, i.e., for every i; jði ¼ 1; . . . ; t; j ¼ 1; . . . ; K;
k ¼ 1; . . . ; gÞ, CP computes
EpkSða
tj;k
i;k Þ ¼ SECðEpkkðai;kÞ;Epkzðtj;kÞÞ:
Then, CP uses EpkzðCjÞ, EpkSða
tj;k
i;k Þðk ¼ 1; . . . ; gÞ to calculate
EpkSðCja
tj;1
i;1    a
tj;g
i;g Þ by calling MSM protocol for g-times, and
the results will be used for further processing.
2. Secure outsourced function calculation stage (Stage Two).
The stage two of the enhanced POFD is the same as that of
secure outsourced function calculation stage in basic POFD
(see Section 4.3.3).
Remark. If the CP, CSPs can support parallelized computa-
tion, all the transactions can be processed in parallel,
which can greatly decrease the computing time. It is
because all the transactions are mutual independence
and can be proceed simultaneously. Moreover, for each
individual transaction, it can be also processed in a paral-
lel manner. For example, in stage one of POFD, the exe-
cution of SECB (SEC in the enhanced version) for each
dimension k (k ¼ 1; . . . ; g) can be processed parallel in
one round between CP and CSPs.
4.5 Decryption with Fine-Grained Authentication
Once a RU wants to decrypt some computed results which
are associated with DP a’s original data, he must get the
authorization from DP a (as the ownership of the original
data is DP a). Without deploying any specific authorization
mechanism, the final result may leak some information
about the original data from the individual DP. Such
kinds of attacks are simple and efficient. For example, a RU
wants to get DP 1’s data and constructs a function query
F : fðxÞ ¼ x1, and send F to CP. After calculation, RU can
easily obtain the DP 1’s data with his own private key if
none of the authentication method is adopted.
In order to solve this problem,we present a simple yet ele-
gant solution. The final results will be encrypted using the
jointly public key associated with different DPs and the RU.
If the RUwishes to obtain the final plaintext, the RU needs to
obtain partially decrypted results (authorization) from the
involved DPs. For example, a RU z’s public key is
pkz ¼ ðN; g; hz ¼ guzÞ, DP a and DP b’ public keys are
pka ¼ ðN; g; ha ¼ guaÞ and pkb ¼ ðN; g; hb ¼ gubÞ, respectively.
The final result x is encrypted with pkS ¼ ðN; g; hS ¼
guzþuaþubÞ (i.e., EpkSðxÞ ¼ fT1; T2g ¼ fhrð1þ xNÞmodN2; T2
¼ grmodN2g). If DP a (or DP b) allows the RU to access the
finally results, DP a (or DP b) will calculate WTa ¼
ðT2Þua modN2 (or WTb ¼ ðT2Þub modN2), and sends WTa (or
WTb) to the RU z. Once both partially decrypted ciphertext
and original ciphertext are received, the RU should first exe-
cuteWTz ¼ ðT2Þuz modN2, and then obtain obtain x by calcu-
lating x ¼ LðT1=ðWTa WTb WTzÞÞ.7 We regard our solution
to be fine-grained as it is related to each encrypted result, at
the cost of a communication round between CP and all DPs.8
If the system does not need this fine-grained authorization,
the system can simply use traditional authentication method
to authorize DPs and RUs [18], [19]. In this situation, DPs can
be totally offline after outsourcing the data.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the security of PCDD and
then show that our basic and enhanced POFD can reach
two different security levels defined in 3.2.
5.1 Analysis of PCDD
5.1.1 The Existence of Strong Private Key Splitting
We randomly separate the strong private key SK ¼  into a
parts and denote them as SKðiÞ ¼ i, s.t.,
Pa
i¼1 i 	 0mod
and
Pa
i¼1 i 	 1modN2 hold at the same time. Due to
gcdð;N2Þ ¼ 1, thus 9 s, s.t. s 	 0mod and s 	 1modN2
hold at the same time (thanks to Chinese remainder theo-
rem [20], s ¼   ð1 modN2ÞmodN2). Thus, we only need
to randomly choose iði ¼ 1; . . . ;aÞ, s.t.,
Pa
i¼1 i ¼ s.
5.1.2 The Correctness of Distributed Decryption
The correctness of distributed decryption can be listed as
follows:
T 00 ¼
Ya
i¼1
CT ðiÞ ¼
Ya
i¼1
ðT1Þi
¼ gru
Pa
i¼1 ið1þmN
Xa
i¼1
iÞmodN2
¼ 1þm N modN2:
6. The number of monomials contained in F0 areK.
7. The function LðxÞ is defined as LðxÞ ¼ x1N .
8. A RU can obtain the data from some specific DPs for calculation.
Such information can be protected from the adversary by constructing
the pkS with all DPs’ private keys. If the information does not need to
be protected, only the necessary DPs are involved to do the partial
decryption (authorization).
LIU ETAL.: A PRIVACY-PRESERVING OUTSOURCED FUNCTIONALCOMPUTATION FRAMEWORK ACROSS LARGE-SCALE MULTIPLE... 3573
By executing LðÞ, the messagem can be calculated as
m ¼ LðT 00Þ ¼ ð1þm NmodN
2Þ  1
N
:
5.2 Security of PCDD
The security of our PCDD can be guaranteed by the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 1. The PCDD scheme described in Section 4.1 is
semantic secure under Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption
modulo a square composite number.
Proof. The proof of PCDD security can be divided into two
parts: 1) the privacy of ciphertext; 2) the privacy of
divided private key.
The privacy of PCDD ciphertext follows directly from
that of a simple public-key cryptosystem with a double
trapdoor decryption mechanism [16], which has been
proven to be semantically secure in the standard model
assuming the intractability of the Decisional Diffie-Hell-
man (DDH) assumption modulo a square composite
number N (the hardness of DDH assumption over Z
N2
can be found in [16]).
The privacy of divided private key is guaranteed by
Shamir secret sharing scheme [21] which is information-
theoretic secure. The strong private key SK is randomly
split into a shares in a way that any less than a shares
cannot recover the original SK (i.e., ða;aÞ-Shamir secret
sharing technique is used). It further implies that the
adversary cannot cover the original plaintext with less
than a shares of partially decrypted ciphertexts (as the
adversary can select a 1 shares all by himself). tu
5.3 Security of Sub-Protocol
In order to prove the security of MSM, SECB and SEC, the fol-
lowing security analysis are considered in the semi-honest
model only, meaning that all parties follow the protocol
description but try to gather information about other parties
inputs, intermediate results, or overall outputs just by looking
at the protocols transcripts. As usual, security in this model is
proven in the real-vs.-ideal framework [22]. Note that the
security of all our protocols is essentially based on the well-
known technique of “blinding” the plaintext [23]: Given an
encryption of a message, we use the additively homomorphic
property of the PCDD cryptosystem to add a random mes-
sage to it, which blinds the original plaintext. Before the actual
computations are preformed, all the DP’s private inputs are
encrypted by PCDD cryptosystem and then outsourced to
CP. Next, we will show that neither CP nor CSPi
ði ¼ 1; . . . ;aÞ can learn anything from the sub-protocols.
5.3.1 Security of MSM
In order to guarantee the security of MSM protocol, the origi-
nal message x and y, and the final result x  y cannot be
known by CP and CSPi ði ¼ 1; . . . ;aÞ. In MSM, the two
encrypted data EpkiðxÞ and EpkjðyÞ are stored in CP and are
used as the input of the protocol. Due to the semantically
security of PCDD, it is impossible for CP to get x and y.
After calculation over the ciphertexts, X, Y , S1 and S2 are
sent to CSPi. Due to the character of the Shamir secret shar-
ing techniques [21], it is hard for adversary to recover the
strong private key to decrypt the message even the adver-
sary compromises the a 1 CSPs (because all the shares are
randomly selected, the adversary can also select a 1
shares all by himself). Once the CSPs1 get the partially
decrypted ciphertexts XðiÞ, Y ðiÞ, SðiÞ1 and S
ðiÞ
2 from CSPi
ði ¼ 1; . . . ;aÞ, it can get the plaintext value of X, Y , S1 and
S2. However, it is still impossible for CSPs1 to get the
value x and y due to the security of “blinding” technique
[23] (x is blinded by r1; y is blinded by r2; r2x is blinded
by R1; r1y is blinded by R2). After calculating, the T
0
1; T
0
2
and h0 are sent to CP. It is hard for CP to get the plaintext
value of x  y due to the semantically security of PCDD. In
all, the security of MSM can be guaranteed by the above-
mentioned analysis.
5.3.2 Security of SECB
The security proof of SECB is similar to that of MSM’s proof.
The difference is that CP uses h to blind the original mes-
sage x. Due to the security of “blinding” technique, it is
hard for CSPs to get real value of x.
5.3.3 The Security of SEC
The security proof of SEC is similar to that of MSM’s proof.
The difference is that CP uses R and t2 to blind the the origi-
nal message x and generates encrypted X1 and Y2, respec-
tively. Then, CP uses r and t1 to blind the the message y
and generates encrypted X2 and Y1, and X1, X2, Y1, Y2 are
sent to CSPi ði ¼ 1; . . . ;aÞ. After partial decryption, CSPi
ði ¼ 1; . . . ;a; i 6¼ s1Þ sends XðiÞ1 , XðiÞ2 to CSPs1, while CSPi
ði ¼ 1; . . . ;a; i 6¼ s2Þ sends Y ðiÞ1 and Y ðiÞ2 to CSPs2. Due to the
security of blinding technique, it still impossible for CSPs1
and CSPs2 to get the value x and y. After sending H, K3, K4
to CP, it is hard for CP to get the plaintext value of xy due to
the semantically security of PCDD. In all, the security of
SEC can be guaranteed by the above-mentioned analysis.
5.4 Security of Basic POFD
Here, we analyze that our basic POFD can resist adversary
Awhich achieve Level-I privacy.
If A eavesdrop the transmission link between the RU z
and CP, the encrypted coefficients EpkzðCjÞ and the
final results EpkSðoiÞ are got by A. Moreover, Epkkðai;kÞ
transmitted between DP and CP and the transformed
ciphertext (X; Y; S1; S2; X
ðiÞ; Y ðiÞ; SðiÞ1 ; S
ðiÞ
2 ; T
0
1; T
0
2; h
0 in MSM
and X;XðiÞ; H in SECB) transmitted between CP and CSPi
may also be eavesdropped by A. Because all these data are
transmitted in encrypted form, it is impossible for A to
decrypt the ciphertext without knowing the RU’s private
key & jointly private key due to the semantically security of
the PCDD cryptosystem.
Next, suppose A compromises specific numbers of CSPs,
says a 1 CSPs, to get their partial private keys. However,
A cannot recover the strong private key to decrypt the
ciphertext. It is because all the partial strong private keys
are randomly split by executing SkeyS algorithm of PCDD
(the privacy of divided private key in PCDD can be found
in Section 5.2). Moreover, even A compromises some of the
RUs to get their weak private keys, and tries the decrypt
the challenge RU function’s coefficients and final outputs. A
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cannot decrypt the challenge RU’s and PDs’ ciphertexts
because all the weak private keys in PCDD are unrelated
(the weak private keys are selected randomly and inde-
pendently). Furthermore, A may compromise some DPs,
and get their private keys (DPs’ data are involved in the
function calculation). However, A cannot get the plain-
text values of the function’s output due to all the coeffi-
cients are encrypted with challenge RU’s public key. In
all, A cannot know the challenge RU’s sensitive informa-
tion which satisfies Level-I privacy which defined in
Section 3.2.
5.5 Security of Enhanced POFD
Here, we analyze that our enhanced POFD can resist the
adversary A. The analysis is similar to that of basic
POFD list in Section 5.4. The difference is that extra
encrypted query Epkz ðti;kÞ should be sent to CP in the
enhanced POFD and SEC should be executed instead of
SECB in the basic POFD (the security proof of SEC can
be found in Section 5.3.3). For any challenger RU z, A
cannot decrypt Epkz ðti;kÞ without knowing z’s private
key. The compromised DPs will not affect the out-
sourced function’s output because the coefficients
Cjðj ¼ 1; . . . ; kÞ and degrees tj;1 . . . ; tj;g are encrypted
using the challenge RU’s public key. In all, A cannot
know the challenge RU’s and DPs’ sensitive information
which satisfies Level-II privacy defined in Section 3.2.
6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of basic version
and enhanced version of POFD. Both the computation cost
and communication overhead will be analyzed.
6.1 Experimental Analysis
We evaluate computation cost and communication over-
head of the proposed POFD by using a custom simulator
built in Java. The experiment is run on test machine
with 2.83 GHz four-core processors and 4 GB memory.
Both synthetic dataset and real dataset will be used to
test POFD.
6.1.1 Synthetic Dataset
We use synthetic dataset which is randomly generated to
test the two POFD proposed in this work. The dataset con-
tains 500 tuples. Each tuple contains 10 attributes. Each
attribute of tuple is randomly picked from 1 to 5,000. There
are three factors which affect the total running time of the
POFD: i) the number of monomials contained in outsourced
functions (NNF); ii) the number of tuples in the synthetic
dataset (NUM); iii) the dimension of the vector existed in
the dataset (DIM).
We first test the performance of PCDD scheme and sub-
protocol (including MSM protocol, SECB protocol and SEC
protocol), and list the results in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
We denote N as 1,024 bits to achieve 80-bit security levels
[24]. In Fig. 4, we plot both the computation cost and com-
munication overhead which vary with the number of mono-
mials contained in outsourced functions (NNF). Because
more queries (coefficients of the function and the degree of
the function) are encrypted and sent to CP for computation,
both the computation cost and communication overhead in
RU’s side and server’s side increase with the NNF in both
POFD versions. Furthermore, the enhanced POFD is much
more costly than the basic POFD. Because SEC protocol in
the enhanced POFD are more costly than the corresponding
SECB protocol in the basic POFD. In Fig. 5, we plot both the
computation cost and communication overhead which vary
with the number of tuples (NUM). As shown in the figure,
both the computation cost and communication overhead in
RU’s side and server’s side increase with the NUM in both
POFD. It is because more tuples will be processed in CP and
more encrypted results will be transmitted back to RU. The
enhanced POFD are more costly than basic POFD, and the
analysis is similar to that of the analysis about NNF. In
Fig. 6, we plot both the computation cost and communica-
tion overhead which vary with the dimension of the trans-
action existed in the dataset (DIM). From the figure we can
see that both the computation cost and communication
overhead over the server side of the basic and enhanced
POFD increase with DIM. However, the computation cost
TABLE 2
The Performance of PCDD Scheme
(1,000-Times for Average, a ¼ 3, 80-bit Security Level)
Algorithm Enc WDec PSDec DDec SDec
Time 47.7 ms 24.8 ms 53.0 ms 0.2 ms 93.1 ms
TABLE 3
The Performance of Sub-Protocol
(1,000-Times for Average, a ¼ 3, 80-bit Security Level)
Protocol Party A compute. Party B compute. Commu.
MSM 920 ms 796 ms 8.492 KB
SECB 187 ms 203 ms 1.749 KB
SEC 3,826 ms 780 ms 26.980 KB
Fig. 4. Experiment analysis vary with NNF in the synthetic dataset (NUM ¼ 100, DIM ¼ 2, a ¼ 3).
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and communication overhead over the RU side of the
enhanced POFD increase with DIM while the basic POFD is
free from DIM.
6.1.2 Real Dataset
We use ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE Data Set from UCI
Machine Learning Repository [25] to test the performance of
POFD. There are 536 tuples which include returns of Istanbul
Stock Exchange with seven other international index [includ-
ing S&P 500 Index (New York Stock Exchange); Deutscher
Aktien Index (Frankfurt Stock Exchange); FTSE 100 Index
(London Stock Exchange); Nikkei Index (Tokyo Stock
Exchange); Bovespa Index (Brasil Sao Paulo Stock Exchange);
MSCI Europe Index; MSCI Emerging Markets Index] from
Jun 5, 2009 to Feb 22, 2011. We use the seven attributes to test
the efficiency of POFD. Because PCDD can only encrypt posi-
tive integers, all the attributes in the dataset should be normal-
ized into integer before running POFD. This dataset should be
used to test both the computation cost and communication
overhead of different POFD and we list all the results in
Table 4. In the RU side of the basic POFD, only the function’s
coefficients need to be encrypted and sent to the CP. Only the
needed dimensions are involved for function calculation. In
the enhanced POFD, besides coefficients, the encrypted
degree ti;k of a monomials independent variable are also
encrypted by RU and sent to CPwhich involvesmore compu-
tation cost to the RU. Because some redundancy monomials
are used for calculation, more MSM and SEC are involved
which introduce more computational cost and communica-
tion overhead.
6.2 Theoretical Analysis
6.2.1 Computational Cost
In the PCDD scheme, let us assume that one regular expo-
nentiation with an exponent of length l ¼ 2jNj requires
1:5l ¼ 3jN j multiplications [26], e.g., the length of  is jN j
and compute g requires 1:5jNj multiplications. The length
of i are 3jNj and compute gi requires 4:5jNj multiplica-
tions. Due to exponentiation operation is much costly than
the addition and multiplication operation, we ignore some
fix numbers of addition and multiplication operations in
our analysis. For PCDD, the encryptor needs 3jNj multipli-
cations to encrypt the message, costs 1:5jNj by running
WDec, costs 1:5jNj by executing SDec, costs 4:5jNj to run
PSDec, and costs amultiplications to runDDec. For the basic
sub-protocols, it costs ð18aþ 30ÞjNj þ 4a multiplications by
executing the MSM protocol, costs ð4:5aþ 10:5ÞjN j þ amulti-
plications for system to run SECB protocol and costs
ð54aþ 93ÞjNj þ 12a multiplications to execute SEC protocol
(see Section 5 and Table 5). In basic POFD, it costs the RU
OðkjNjÞ multiplications to encrypted all the coefficients Cj,
costs OðkgtajNjÞ multiplications in Stage One, costs OðktÞ
multiplications in Stage Two, and costs the RUOðtjNjÞmul-
tiplications to decrypt all the final results. In enhanced
POFD, it costs the RU OðKjNjÞ multiplications to encrypt
all the coefficients Cj and costs OðKgjN jÞ multiplications
to encrypt degree of all the monomials. In all, it costs
OðKtgajNjÞmultiplications in Stage One, costs OðKtÞmul-
tiplications in Stage Two, and costs the RUOðtjN jÞmultipli-
cations to decrypt all the final results.
Fig. 5. Experiment analysis vary with NUM in the synthetic dataset (NNF ¼ 2, DIM ¼ 2, a ¼ 3).
Fig. 6. Experiment analysis vary with DIM in the synthetic dataset (NUM ¼ 100, NNF ¼ 2, a ¼ 3).
TABLE 4
Experiment on Real Dataset (NUM = 536, DIM = 3, k ¼ 3, K = 5, a ¼ 3, 80-bits Security Level, Parallelized Computation)
POFD Compu. (RU) Compu. (server) Commu.(RU & CP) Commu.(CSP & CP) MSM Times SECB Times SEC Times
Basic 14.365 s 0.415 min 0.263 MB 73.296 MB 6,432 4,824 0
Enhanced 15.215 s 1.817 min 0.271 MB 320.271 MB 10,720 0 8,040
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6.2.2 Communication Overhead
In this section, we compare the communication overhead in
both basic POFD and enhanced POFD. In PPCD scheme,
each T1 and T2 needs 2jNj bits to represent. Thus, the
ciphertext EpkðxÞ will need 4jN j bits to transmit. In the basic
POFD, the RU needs to send all the encrypted coefficients
EpkzðCjÞ to CP which takes OðkjNjÞ bits to communicate
and costs OðkgtajNjÞ in Stage One of the basic POFD (costs
4ð6aþ 1ÞjNj bits to run MSM and 2ð3aþ 1ÞjNj bits to execut-
ing SECB). Moreover, all the results EpkSðoiÞ should be sent
back to the RU which takes OðtjN jÞ bits to transmit. So it
costs OðktgajN jÞ bits (one round between CP and the RU)
to transmit all the encrypted data in the transmission link.
In the enhanced POFD, the RU needs to send all the
encrypted coefficients EpkzðCjÞ and the degree of mono-
mials Epkz ðtj;kÞ to CP which takes OðKajN jÞ bits to commu-
nicate. Also, it takes OðKgtajN jÞ bits by executing Stage
One of the enhanced POFD (24ð3aþ 1ÞjNj bits for executing
SEC for one time). Moreover, all the results costs OðtjNjÞ
bits to transmit. So it costs OðKgtajNjÞ bits (one round
between CP and the RU, OðKtgÞ rounds between CP and
CSPs) to transmit all the encrypted data in the transmission
link. Both the computational and communication compari-
son results are shown in Table 6.
7 RELATED WORK
With the development of cloud computing, more and more
data are generated and outsourced to cloud servers for stor-
age. As cloud server is always a third-party server, data need
to be encrypted to keep sensitive information from curious
adversary. One of the important questions is how to perform
calculations over the encrypted data. Homomorphic encryp-
tion is a form of encryption that allows computations to be
carried out in ciphertexts which reflects on some operations
over the plaintext. Additive homomorphic encryption
scheme (e.g., Paillier cryptosystem [14], Benaloh cryptosys-
tem [27]) allows other parties to do some operations over the
ciphertext which reflect on some additive calculations over
the plaintext while multiplication homomorphic encryption
(e.g., Unpadded RSA cryptosystem [28], ElGamal cryptosys-
tem [29]) reflect on some multiplication calculations over the
plaintext. Although a lot of protocols [30], [31] and applica-
tions [32], [33], [34] are proposed using these two kinds of
homomorphic cryptosystems, it has been a tricky problem to
achieve both addition andmultiplication in plaintexts by cal-
culation over the ciphertexts at the same time. A cryptosys-
tem that supports arbitrary computations on ciphertexts is
known as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and is far
more powerful. Gentry [35] firstly constructs a fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme based on lattice-based cryptog-
raphy which supports both addition and multiplication
operations on ciphertexts. After that, a lot of works are pro-
posed on fully homomorphic cryptosystem [36], [37]. How-
ever, one of the biggest drawbacks of the fully homomorphic
cryptosystem is the complexity of the systems and it is not
practical to be implemented over real systems [38], [39].
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is one of the
important branches of the cryptography with the goal to
create methods for parties to jointly compute a function
over their inputs, and keeping these inputs private. The his-
tory of the multi-party computation problem is first intro-
duced by Yao [40], and extended by Goldreich et al. [41]. As
MPC is relied on some sophisticated subprotocols (e.g.,
zero-knowledge proofs), a lot of works are proposed in
order to reduce the computational cost [42] and communi-
cation cost [43], [44] of MPC. Recently, a general multiparty
computation (MPC) protocol is designed which is based on
multi-key fully homomorphic encryption [45]. However, it
is still not practical to implement. Several privacy-preserv-
ing applications using garbled circuit techniques [46], [47]
have been implemented in the past few years. However,
general results for special cases of multi-party computation
are impractical for some specific scenario [48]. Due to effi-
ciency reasons, special solutions for privacy-preserving
computation are designed to achieve secure computation,
such as, privacy-preserving scalar product [49], secure
greater than protocol [50], privacy-preserving top-K proto-
col [51], secure pattern matching [52], and secure vector
dominance protocol [53]. Using traditional MPC to solve
the problem needs at least two rounds communications
between user and server. However, as we point out in the
paper, one round communication is optimal from the user’s
view. For the practical reason, our POFD can efficiently
achieve one round communication between the user and
the server which is optimal. Moreover, all the data pro-
viders can be offline after outsourcing their own data. This
feature is especially fit for large-scale computation system.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new framework named POFD
for privacy-preserving outsourced functional computation
across large-scale multiple encrypted domains. By running
the POFD, a user can efficiently get the final results in one
round communication without compromising the privacy
of the user’s query and the privacy of the data. As a key
component of POFD, a new public key cryptosystem was
designed to support distributed decryption. Moreover,
TABLE 5
Theoretical Analysis of the Sub-Protocol
Protocol Computation (/mul) Communication (/bits)
MSM ð18aþ 30ÞjN j þ 4a 4ð6aþ 1ÞjN j
SECB ð4:5aþ 10:5ÞjN j þ a 2ð3aþ 1ÞjN j
SEC ð54aþ 193ÞjN j þ 12a 24ð3aþ 1ÞjN j
TABLE 6
Theoretical Analysis of POFD
POFD T. Comput. (/mul) T. Commun. (/bits) RU Comput. (/mul) RU & CP Commu. (/bits) RU & CP CP & CSPs
Basic OðkgtajN jÞ OðkgtajNjÞ Oððkþ tÞjNjÞ Oððkþ tÞjNjÞ One Round OðktgÞ rounds
Enhanced OðKgtajNjÞ OðKgtajN jÞ OððKg þ tÞjNjÞ OððKg þ tÞjNjÞ One Round OðKtgÞ rounds
LIU ETAL.: A PRIVACY-PRESERVING OUTSOURCED FUNCTIONALCOMPUTATION FRAMEWORK ACROSS LARGE-SCALE MULTIPLE... 3577
three new protocols called Multi-domain Secure Multiplica-
tion (MSM) protocol, Secure Exponent Calculation Protocol
with Private Base (SECB), and Secure Exponent Calculation
Protocol (SEC) protocol were presented which collectively
achieve the functionality of POFD defined in the paper. In
addition, through extensive performance evaluation, we
demonstrated that our POFD is able to balance the compu-
tation-intensive function computation and user’s privacy
disclosure at different security levels. As future work, we
will study POFDwhich can handle more complex functions.
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